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examiner's opportunity to observe witnesses he hears and sees and
which the Board does not."
Universal Camera does not alter the primary function of the
Board in making fact determinations. The requirement for canvassing
the whole record in order to ascertain substantiality is not intended
to reduce the role of the Board as one of those agencies presumably
equipped or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field
of knowledge, whose findings within that field carry the authority
of expertise which courts do not possess and therefore must respect.°°
Nor does it mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court
may displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views."
Therefore, as the Northern Metal dissent suggested, it would be per-
missible in satisfying the substantial evidence test for the trial ex-
aminer to reject only part of the employee's testimony without rejecting
all of it.°2
It is submitted that the Northern Metal holding that an individual
employee is not engaged in protected concerted activity when he at-
tempts, outside of the grievance machinery, to enforce rights under
a collective bargaining agreement thwarts the purposes of the Act—
the promotion of harmony in labor-management relations and the
recognition of the individual's right to engage in activities for mutual
protection and individual security. It is true that the overall policy
of the Act may be better served if the employee processes his griev-
ance through the union representative. However, as the facts of
Northern Metal demonstrate, this avenue is not always available to
the employee. In any case, where the employee is asserting a right
which he has a reasonable basis to believe is provided by the col-
lective bargaining contract, both Sections 7 and 9 of the Act give
him the right to proceed alone.
PHILLIP A. WICKY
Administrative Law—Due Process Implications in Agency Pro-
ceedings—Sterling National Bank of Davie v. Camp. 1—Appellant,
a bank in Davie, Florida, brought suit to invalidate the granting of
a national bank charter by the Comptroller of the Currency to a
group of individuals wishing to establish a new national bank in
Davie. Both proponents and opponents of the proposed bank were
given the opportunity to present evidence at a hearing to consider
the propriety of chartering the new bank. The complaint alleged that
despite evidence in the administrative file supporting his action, award
59 340 U.S. at 495.
59 Id. at 488.
61 Id.
62 440 F.2d at 889.
1 431 KU 514 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).
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of the charter was unlawful, because the Comptroller had received
ex parte information from the charter applicants and had not pro-
vided a written opinion stating the reasons for his decision.' The
district court granted summary judgment' against the plaintiff, hold-
ing that the Comptroller's decision was within the statutory grant
of authority contained in the National Bank Act.' On appeal, the
circuit court affirmed and HELD: the Comptroller is empowered to
exercise vast discretion in gathering information about prospective
charter applicants, and judicial review is limited to determining whether
or not the action of the Comptroller was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5
The court was confronted with the threshold issue of determining
the permissible range of decision-making by the Comptroller as au-
thorized by Section 27 of the National Bank Act, which states:
If, upon a careful examination of the facts so reported, and
of any other facts which may come to the knowledge of the
comptroller, whether by means of a special commission ap-
pointed by him for the purpose of inquiring into the condition
of such association, or otherwise, it appears that such asso-
ciation is lawfully entitled to commence the business of bank-
ing, the comptroller shall give to such association a certificate,
under his hand and official seal, that such association has com-
plied with all the provisions required to be complied with
before commencing the business of banking, and that such
association is authorized to commence such business. But the
comptroller may withhold from an association his certificate
authorizing the commencement of business, whenever he has
reason to suppose that the shareholders have formed the same
for any other than the legitimate objects contemplated by this
chapter.°
The court interpreted section 27 as conferring "vast discretion on
the Comptroller to approve or disapprove a new charter application" 7
and broad authority to obtain his facts in a variety of ways. Conse-
quently, appellant's criticism of the Comptroller's acceptance of pri-
vately submitted information, and of the lack of a written opinion,
was treated as a demand for a formal adversary hearing which, the
court concluded, is clearly not required by the National Bank Act.
Since the Comptroller is authorized to receive information by special
commission "or otherwise," the court emphasized that "it is obvious
that the Comptroller is authorized to receive information sent to his
2
 Id. at 516.
a Id.
4 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1970).
5
 421 F.2d at 516,
0 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1970) (emphasis added).
7 431 F.2d at 516.
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office by some of the applicants, even though this was done without
the knowledge of those opposing the charter."' This decision illustrates
the problem of whether the limited scope of judicial review of the
Comptroller's actions adequately considers the rights of intervening
parties at the agency level. Alternatively, the issue may be phrased
in terms of whether the Comptroller's authority precludes court deter-
mination of a party's right to cross-examine witnesses and to offer
rebuttal evidence at the agency hearing.
Persistent demands for rudimentary due process safeguards,
such as those particularized in the Administrative Procedure Act°
(APA), have been consistently rejected by courts" in cases such as
Sterling in favor of the extremely flexible fact-gathering procedures
authorized by the National Bank Act. In Webster Groves Trust Com-
pany v. Saxon,"- the appellant-competitor bank sought a declaratory
judgment and an injunction for the purpose of compelling the Comp-
troller to hold an adversary hearing before passing on the merits of
the application. The appellant specifically sought the opportunity to
interrogate and to cross-examine the applicant. The court's rationale,
followed by Sterling,u concluded that whereas the National Bank
Act contained no requirement for a formal hearing, and legislative
history indicated no congressional intent to incorporate any such pro-
cedure, no right to a formal adversary hearing existed."
The Webster court determined that the "very nature of the
decision required by the Comptroller indicates that a formal adversary
type hearing would be of little benefit to him in the exercise of his
discretionary powers." 14
 In this case appellant had admitted that,
although the section of the APA dealing with adjudications applies
only to "adjudication required by statute to be determined on the
record”" and does not expressly apply to the grant of a national
bank charter, applicability of the APA's judicial review provisions"
nevertheless requires a hearing substantially equivalent to a formal
hearing to insure adequate judicial review. The Webster court re-
jected the argument for reading implied hearing requirements into
the National Bank Act," and held that "if the Comptroller acts in
excess or abuse of his legal authority, to this extent his actions are
subject to judicial review, with the burden of proof resting on the
Pi Id. at 517.
9 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq. (1970). 5 U.S.C. fi 554 sets forth the requirements for a
formal adjudication such as notice, identification of the matters at issue, and opportunities
for interested parties to submit evidence and to participate in the agency hearing.
19
 Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968); Ramapo Bank v. Camp,
425 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1970).
11
 370 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1966).
12 431 F.2d at 517.
13
 370 F.2d at 384.
14 Id. at 385.
19 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1970).
10 5 U.S.C. 706 (1970).
17
 370 F.2d at 386.
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party seeking the review."" Thus, courts have uniformly refused to
extend the scope of judicial review to include examination of the
procedural rights afforded a party appearing before the agency. In-
stead, they have preferred to rely on the explicit requirements of the
enabling act, or to utilize the history of congressional intent to ration-
alize the absence of procedural fairness at the agency level.
In First National Bank of Smithfield, North Carolina v. Saxon,"
cited by Sterling,' the court reviewed a decision of the Comptroller
in which the latter had issued no formal statement of fact, conclusions
of law, or opinion. Appellant charged that the Comptroller's procedure
violated the APA and abridged the rights of Smithfield Bank without
affording constitutional due process. The bank claimed that the Comp-
troller's ruling was an adjudication under the APA which could not
be made without notice and a full-dress hearing. 21 The majority in
Smithfield ruled that " [pj rocedural due process is not offended by the
Comptroller's practice. The absence of a hearing provision in the
Banking Act raises no Constitutional question, for the omission was
within the power of Congress." 22
It is submitted that if basic due process rights existing at the
agency level can be demonstrated, then the requisite element of fair-
ness in the agency proceeding cannot be negated by reference to con-
gressional prerogative." Nevertheless, the Smithfield court concluded
that any apprehension about possible arbitrary or capricious agency
action is dissipated by the APA's grant of judicial review' of the
Comptroller's decision in district court." The Act gives the court
jurisdiction to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found
to be—unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are sub-
ject to trial de novo . . /120
It is questionable whether the procedure of de novo review con-
fronts the precise issue of "fairness" before the Comptroller has made
18 Id. at 388. The Supreme Court has broadened the class of parties who may invoke
judicial review to curb possible administrative abuse. In Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the Court stated that parties
who face potential economic injury or litigate issues of public interest should be granted
standing in district court. Accordingly, the Court construed the APA's grant of judicial
review as serving a "broadly remedial purpose." One can easily understand the interest
of an existent bank wishing to contest the grant of a new bank charter in its locale.
However, it must be emphasized that it is not merely a party's fear of competition per
se which should compel recognition of procedural rights for intervening parties. Rather,
it is the judicial rationale that the interest of such parties will serve to insure that the
particular agency action has strictly conformed with applicable standards.
10 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965).
20 431 F.2d at 517.
21 352 F.2d at 270.
22 Id. 12 C.F.R.	 4.2(b)(1970) provides in part that "the Comptroller . .. may
conduct such investigations as he deems necessary or proper."
25 See pp. 190-91 infra.
24 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (1970).
28 352 F.2d at 270.
23 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (1970).
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his decision. The reviewing court is put into the difficult position
of finding facts for the first time, while having to refrain from sub-
stituting its judgment where the Comptroller has exercised expertise
in examining the charter application in light of the goals of the
National Bank Act. Arguably, judicial recognition of the broad discre-
tion given the Comptroller in Section 27 of the National Bank Act,
as evidenced by Sterling and Webster Groves Trust, results in virtu-
ally a perfunctory court review of the Comptroller's decision. In effect,
the district court faces a dilemma. Either it blindly assumes that the
Comptroller's discretion rests upon an adequate basis in fact, in which
event the court review inevitably becomes a meaningless gesture; or,
it acts in ignorance of the decision it is reviewing and proceeds upon
the basis of facts it has found independently. In the latter case, the
court's judgment may usurp the Comptroller's function."
Judicial deference to the Comptroller's vast discretion invariably
compels the courts to affirm his decision so long as the administrative
record contains "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 38 For example, in the
principal case, the Sterling court agreed with the district court that
"the administrative file is replete with evidence which would support
either view." 22 Although the Comptroller had issued no written opin-
ion delineating the reasons for his decision, the court determined
that "it was obviously based on a composite of many factors and much
data. To say that one fact was erroneous and that another fact was
askew is not to infest the Comptroller's exercise of discretion with
the scent of arbitrariness or capriciousness sufficient to set aside his
decision."3 °
It is thus apparent that the party seeking judicial review assumes
the burden of making out a prima facie case of abuse of discretion
in order to obtain a trial de novo. Otherwise, as in Sterling, the court
will generally find that the administrative file supports either view
and thus will enter judgment for the Comptroller. Since every file of
the Comptroller will contain favorable, if not self-serving, evidence
of the applicant, the only situations where an opposing party could
possibly succeed would be if either no evidence were accepted from
the opposing party or no informal hearing were heldP However, in
most situations, these two exceptions will have been avoided, and
the Comptroller's decision arrives in court with virtually an irrefutable
presumption of correctness.
It must be emphasized, therefore, that the existent limited scope
of judicial review, effectively circumscribed by the Comptroller's ex-
27 352 F.2d at 274 (dissenting opinion).
28 Peoples Bank of Trenton v. Saxon, 373 F.2d 185, 189 (6th Cir. 1967), quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
29 431 F.2d at 516.
99 Id. at 517.
31 Cf. 373 F.2d at 188.
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pansive grant of statutory authority, successfully negates the Comp-
troller's decision only in instances of extreme arbitrariness. Presently,
parties such as Sterling National Bank, who submit evidence to the
agency, and who subsequently learn that the Comptroller accepted
ex parte information, have no way of ascertaining whether the Comp-
troller accorded any consideration to their views. Moreover, the courts,
as earlier stated, have no basis upon which to determine the exact
rationale of the Comptroller's decision.32 The dissent in Smithfield
emphasized the status of the Comptroller's decision on review:
The Comptroller's mind has been made up ex parte upon
hearing from the proponent only, but not effectively from
any opponents, for they have been kept in the dark as to the
issues and the evidence. The operative scope of the court re-
view being limited, it cannot easily repair any damage result-
ing from the inadequate practice followed by the Comp-
troller."
It is suggested that the Comptroller's decision could be formulated
more objectively if procedures were implemented which assure op-
posing parties the opportunity to rebut evidence presented by the
applicant. Concomitantly, the reviewing courts would be presented
with an administrative record demonstrating that substantial data
on the points in issue supported the Comptroller's decision.
Although courts have rejected claims for a formal hearing on
the ground that the APA applies only to agencies whose enabling
statute expressly provides for one, it is arguable whether utilization
of procedures affording minimum due process to parties appearing
before the agency should be contingent upon applicability of the
APA. Although the Comptroller has wide latitude in conducting an
investigation of the charter applicant," he acts according to statutory
'' Although courts have relied on the absence of explicit statutory language which
would require the Comptroller to issue an opinion, recognition of due process rights
would compel a statement of findings in spite of a literal reading of the APA provision.
Sec Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). Moreover, an opinion affords the
reviewing court the opportunity to fulfill the stated ideal—"the orderly functioning of
the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the administrative agency
acted be dearly disclosed and adequately distinguished." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.
80, 94 (1943).
The need for effective judicial review was illustrated in a recent Supreme Court
decision in which citizen groups attempted to challenge a decision made by the Secretary
of the Department of Transportation. In reversing in favor of the petitioners-conserva-
tionists, the Court noted that although the Secretary had not been required to issue formal
findings, the judicial review provisions of the APA required, in this instance, that on
remand to the district court for plenary review of the Secretary's decision, review was to
be based on the entire administrative record to determine whether the decision was based
on a consideration of relevant factors, and whether there had been a clear error of
judgment. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
33 352 F.2d at 274 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
84 It should be noted that the Comptroller's discretion is somewhat limited in those
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guidelines when he considers public interest, need and necessity, and,
subject to court review, when he exercises discretion in determining
such public interest or need and necessity. 35 However, the important
role played by an intervening party at the agency level, for example
that of Sterling Bank, cannot be underestimated.
Competing parties arguably serve as catalysts to illuminate what
might be the merits or deficiencies of an application. More impor-
tantly, a future competitor challenging an application may be viewed
as a representative of the general public." This situation arises from
the fact that an application can be denied only in terms of the public
need and interest, and not as a result of any adverse economic im-
pact on the challenging party. Even though the party's motivation
might be derived from predominately economic considerations rather
than from a spirit of public service, the intervening bank fulfills the
function of presenting the community's response as regards the issues,
albeit in a subdued adversary context. Since the issuance of bank
charters to conduct an activity totally responsible to governmental
regulation directly affects the rights and choices of citizens in the
local community, it is thus conceivable that a party representing the
public interest and challenging the grant of a bank charter should be
afforded basic due process rights which might indirectly deter an
abuse of governmental discretion.
There is little doubt that an individual directly affected by an
agency decision could successfully assert his constitutional rights. In
Goldberg v. Kelley," the Supreme Court had to determine the pro-
cedural due process rights of a welfare recipient whose benefits had
been summarily terminated by the agency. Finding a violation of his
constitutional rights, the Court reiterated the precept that "[t] he
fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be
heard . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 38
Furthermore, the Goldberg Court, dealing with a uniquely govern-
mental activity, acknowledged that "what procedures due process
may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with
a determination of the precise nature of the governmental function
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action."" A bank facing future competition concededly
has a private interest in challenging a new bank charter. In appearing
before the agency, however, the bank also assumes the status of a
community representative to insure that the community is protected
instances where the application is for a branch bank. The existence of relevant state
statutes has a direct influence in those situations. See 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1970).
35 12 C.F.R. * 4.2(b)(3) (1970) provides that the Comptroller should consider
"[t]he convenience and needs of the community to be served by the proposed bank."
80 FCC v. Sanders Eros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
37 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
38 Id. at 267.
3° Id. at 263, quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961).
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from a banking enterprise perhaps antithetical to the public interest.
It is submitted that this status should generate some form of applica-
tion of the constitutional rights discussed in Goldberg. The imple-
mentation of Goldberg's "meaningful" procedures would not, and
should not, require a formal hearing. Instead, judicial review should
focus on whether an interested party has had an opportunity to fairly
present its view.
Present procedures utilized for judicial review of a decision by
the Comptroller of the Currency, as illustrated by the Sterling deci-
sion, fail to adequately correct what might be termed rudimentary
due process deficiencies at the agency level. Even if this is a case
where there is no constitutional compulsion for a formal hearing
because of the sensitive nature of the banking business," one must
note that an informal procedure is not the equivalent of no procedure,
and that the fundamentals of procedural due process must be observed
even in an informal conference." It has been argued that even in
a fact-gathering procedure, due regard should be given to a party
in order that he may possess knowledge of and confront opposing
evidence with an explanation of rebuttal evidence:" This would seem
to be the minimum required by Goldberg, for only if the adversary
party is familiar with the evidence of the applicant can a "mean-
ingful" case be made. Without knowledge of the applicant's evidence,
the informal proceeding, and the standing of the bank to intervene
in the proceeding, become empty gestures fulfilling the form but not
the substance of the right.
Whether the public interest was better served by the Comptroller's
acceptance of ex parte information in the Sterling decision rather
than by allowing the competitor bank to examine and possibly counter
the information is questionable. Indeed, precisely because there is no
way of determining on what grounds the Comptroller's decision was
made, the courts should insure that agency discretion be maintained
within the circumference of the National Bank Act by requiring pro-
cedural due process safeguards. Such an approach would eliminate
the danger of administrative caprice. The self-interest of a competitor
like Sterling Bank may advance the public interest by raising issues
that may otherwise never be brought to the Comptroller's attention.
Accessibility to the applicant's evidence would also conform to the
Goldberg admonition that what is a "meaningful" set of procedures
must be determined in relation "to the precise nature of the govern-
mental function involved . . . ."'s The Comptroller could promulgate
rules allowing interested parties to obtain disclosure of pertinent
issues and non-confidential information. Furthermore, the Comptroller
has little to gain by denying the existing bank a chance to see the
40 431 F.2d at 517.
41 352 F.2d at 275.
42 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 1) 4.14 (Stipp. 1965).
43 397 U.S. at 263.
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application, the supporting data, or reports made by hearing exam-
iners."
The principle of fairness demands that each party be entitled
to know the data presented to the Comptroller by the applicant, in
order that objecting banks can perform the essential function of repre-
senting the vital interests of the community. The right of judicial
review cannot be taken as fully realized, however, if intervening com-
petitors are excluded from fully participating in the proceeding."
The reluctance of the courts to require due process in governmental
decision-making reinforces and insulates the Comptroller's discretion
from objective scrutiny. Due process and public policy require
a broader recognition of the substantive rights of all parties appearing
before a governmental agency.
ROBERT T. NAGLE
" 352 F.2d at 275.
45 National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch, 429 F.2d 725, 736 (D.C. Cir 1970).
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